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Empirical researchers frequently obtain estimates of the behavioral response to a tax
change by exploiting variation in the degree to which a tax reform affects different groups of
individuals based on their individual characteristics and tax situations. This paper analyzes
the conditions under which it is possible to obtain a causal average treatment effect using
pre-reform characteristics as instruments for the observed tax rate change, which I term the
Fixed-Bracket Average Treatment Effect (FBATE). Previous literature has assumed that
only one of these conditions is sufficient to identify a causal parameter. FBATE identifies
the average treatment effect for individuals with no incentive to switch tax brackets in
response to a tax reform or other shock that affects the bracket in which an individual is
located. FBATE is the relevant parameter for welfare analysis if taxpayers whose response
is identified by the FBATE estimate will have the same long-run response as the rest of the
population. FBATE also highlights new trade-offs between different sources of identification;
for example, an oft-touted source of identification—bracket creep—cannot yield a causal
estimate. The paper also shows that using an alternative definition of treatment relative to
what is usually employed in the literature obtains a causal average treatment effect for a
larger subpopulation under weaker assumptions.
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1 Introduction
Empirical researchers frequently obtain estimates of the behavioral response to a tax change
by exploiting variation in the degree to which a tax reform affects different groups of indi-
viduals based on their individual characteristics and tax situations. Often, the tax schedule
examined has multiple brackets and at least part of the identification of the estimates comes
from differences in legislated tax rate changes across brackets. Examples include examina-
tions of the responses to the personal income tax schedule, the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC), and social security contributions, among others. These estimates are important for
policy analysis, both in terms of deadweight loss and revenue implications. In most contexts,
a theoretical framework has been developed which maps from the estimates obtained to a
calculation of deadweight loss.2
In general, the empirical literature has gone one of two ways—it constructs a measure
of the predicted tax change based on observable characteristics, and then either estimates
the response to this predicted change directly, or uses this as an instrument for the actual
tax rate change. It is relatively clear how to assess the validity and interpret the parameter
when the former approach is employed; however, when the latter approach is employed, it
is less straightforward and the existing literature provides no discussion or guidance on this
matter. This paper seeks to fill in this gap in the literature. By carefully examining the
latter approach, the paper also explains which method may be preferred in a given context.
The challenge of using the actual tax rate as an independent variable in an estimating
equation is that we, as researchers, observe a tax rate for all individuals, but the tax rate
we observe is systematically wrong for certain subgroups. This is because we only observe
the tax rate—the treatment—after individuals have responded, and sometimes individuals
face incentives to cross tax bracket lines (thereby altering their observed treatment) as part
of their behavioral response. This “treatment mismeasurement” will systematically bias the
2For example, Eissa et al. (2008) do this for the EITC, and Feldstein (1999) and Chetty (2009) do this
for the elasticity of taxable income (ETI).
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estimates unless addressed properly. This is unlike a labor or other classic treatment effect
setting in which there may be selection into treatment, but the treatment that determines
individuals’ responses is observed, and if there was a random assignment mechanism before
selection, treatment based on random assignment is also observed. Because of the difference
in the point at which researchers studying tax rate changes can observe treatment and the re-
sulting treatment mismeasurement this introduces, the standard analysis and interpretation
of the estimates obtained does not apply.
The main contribution of this paper is to derive the conditions under which it is possible
to obtain a causal average treatment effect using pre-reform characteristics as instruments,
taking treatment mismeasurement into consideration. I call the treatment effect obtained the
Fixed-Bracket Average Treatment Effect (FBATE), which will identify the average treatment
effect for individuals with no incentive to switch tax brackets in response to a tax reform or
other shock that affects the tax bracket in which an individual is located. FBATE provides
a standard which can be used to assess possible instruments and sources of identifying
variation, interpret existing parameters, and identify conditions under which the response to
future anticipated, as well as current, tax changes can be estimated.
Applying FBATE to the existing literature provides a useful interpretation of the esti-
mates. For estimates that identify FBATE, this paper highlights that such estimates exclude
particular types of individuals—those with an incentive to deviate across tax bracket lines
due a marginal tax rate change—and these individuals may or may not respond in a similar
way as other individuals. Therefore, FBATE is the relevant parameter for welfare analysis if
taxpayers whose response is identified by the FBATE estimate will have the same long-run
response as the rest of the population.
Assessing possible instruments and sources of identifying variation in light of FBATE
provides new insights regarding what is ideal. For example, the ETI literature has touted
using bracket creep as a source of identifying variation because it changes the marginal tax
rate for individuals who are otherwise quite similar(e.g., Saez et al., 2012). The literature
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has also noted that individuals may not be aware of such detailed changes in their marginal
tax rate, and even if they are, these may not be the most appropriate changes to examine
to identify the underlying structural parameter if individuals face substantial optimization
frictions (e.g., Saez et al., 2012; Chetty, 2011). However, as will be shown below, using
bracket creep as a source of identifying variation will never provide a causal average treatment
effect. Additionally, switching to a context in which there is a large marginal tax rate change
where individuals will overcome the optimization frictions they face, is not necessarily better,
because high optimization frictions will provide greater incentives for individuals to shift
tax brackets in response to a tax reform. This suggests that, in reality, there is likely a
trade-off between the bias that comes from using a smaller marginal tax rate change, where
the estimate is closer to FBATE but further away from the structural parameter desired for
welfare calculations (Chetty, 2011), and a larger marginal tax rate change where the opposite
is true.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out a framework for causal inference and
derives FBATE in this context for panel data under certain assumptions. Section 3 provides
several empirical applications of these results. Section 4 discusses broader implications for
the literature given the results in Section 2. Section 5 concludes.
2 Framework and Causal Inference
In this section, I lay out a framework for causal inference and derive the conditions under
which a causal average treatment effect is obtained. The framework shares some similarities
with standard treatment effect settings, but also has a few notable differences due to the fact
that, in this context, individuals respond to the treatment they receive and sometimes this
response changes the treatment observed by the researcher. When this occurs, the actual and
observed treatments no longer coincide. I call this problem “treatment mismeasurement.”
The problem is similar to the “contamination bias” discussed in Heckman and Robb (1985),
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in the sense that we do not observe treatment accurately for all, and if we assigned treatment
in the most obvious, observable way, the estimates would be biased. It is very different
from the large literature on imperfect compliance with experiments in which the relevant
treatment after selection has taken place is observed. I consider both using a proxy measure
for treatment and an instrument with treatment defined as the observed tax rate in each
period.
I will use the estimation of the ETI as my running example throughout the paper; how-
ever, the analytics are written generally for any marginal or average tax rate change, and
clearly apply broadly to all cases in which researchers are trying to estimate the causal effect
of a tax rate change when there are multiple tax brackets. For estimation of the ETI, the out-
come of interest is taxable income and taxable income is also the determinant of the marginal
tax rate faced. I assume that the researcher has access to panel data for the derivations,
but I discuss how the results apply to repeated-cross-section analyses as well. Subsection
2.1 considers a simplified case, in which some of the complexities of this estimation problem
are ignored in order to build intuition. These assumptions are then relaxed in Subsection
2.2. Subsection 2.3 extends the analysis in Subsection 2.2 to consider the estimation of an
anticipated tax reform.
2.1 Stylized Example
This subsection uses a stylized example, which strips away some of the additional complex-
ities of the estimation problem in order to build intuition. The results in this subsection
are often starker than those in Subsection 2.2 which eliminates the stylized assumption, but
the important points and intuition carry through. This section shows that while treatment
in this literature has traditionally been determined period by period, a more natural way
of thinking about treatment is the treatment determined by the first period. Defining the
treatment period by period requires stronger assumptions to obtain a causal average treat-
ment effect, and this treatment effect—FBATE—is identified over a narrower subpopulation.
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Additionally, if excluding individuals far away from the treatment cutoff based on the vari-
able that determines treatment status (taxable income), this cutoff should be imposed as a
function of income in the first period, not income period by period, to avoid introducing a
bias in the estimates. In practice, the latter method is used frequently when repeated-cross-
section data is used. Lastly, this section shows that, with the introduction of treatment
mismeasurement, rescaling the ITT estimate using a Wald estimator does not necessarily
get closer to obtaining the average treatment effect.
The simplifying assumption imposed in this subsection is as follows:
Assumption 1: Income is fixed, except when it responds to a change in the tax rate;
that is, it does not move for secular reasons, including transitory income shocks.
This means that the only reason income changes is in response to a change in the tax rate.
Consider the tax reform depicted in Figure 5. There are two periods, period 1 and period 2.
In period 1, the tax rate is the same for all individuals. In period 2, the marginal tax rate
is higher for all individuals above the tax kink k.3 Defining the treatment and comparison
group based on period 1 income, the treatment group t1 consists of those who are above k
in period 1 and the comparison group c1 includes those below k. In period 1, there is no
tax kink at point k, so that the tax rates are the same for both groups τc1 = τt1. In period
2, a tax kink is introduced so that individuals above k face a tax rate τt2 > τc2. In order to
exploit this potentially attractive quasi-natural experiment, I assume the following:
Assumption 2a: The change in potential outcome, ∆Y , in the treatment and compari-
son groups is the same, on average.
This assumption imposes that individuals above and below the tax kink in period 1 would
respond in the same way to a tax rate change and, absent a tax rate change, their change in
the outcome variable is the same, on average. Such an assumption is pervasive throughout
the treatment effects literature. To make this assumption hold, in practice, the analysis
3Note that this creates a progressive income tax. If there was a tax decrease above k instead, creating a
regressive tax schedule, some of the analysis would be different, as will be made clear at the end of Subsection
2.2.
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is often restricted to individuals in a region around the tax kink because it is usually not
appropriate to assume, for example, that those making several million dollars would have the
same outcome as those making $20,000, absent a tax reform. To introduce that restriction,
here, let all individuals in [k(1), k(1)] be included in the estimation, where [k(1), k(1)] are
the thresholds [k, k] determined by period 1 income.
We can estimate the causal average treatment effect ε as the difference in the change in
taxable income between these two groups:
ε = E [∆Y (t1)−∆Y (c1)] , (1)
where ∆Y (t1) is equal to ∆Y multiplied by an indicator for being in the treatment group in
period 1 and ∆Y (c1) is equal to ∆Y multiplied by an indicator for being in the comparison
group in period 1. Note that this is equivalent to the following:
ε = E [Y (t1)− Y (c1) | T = 2]− E [Y (t1)− Y (c1) | T = 1] , (2)
where T is a time indicator. This is also equivalent to defining the treatment and comparison
groups in each period to get:
ε = E [Y (t2)− Y (c2) | T = 2]− E [Y (t1)− Y (c1) | T = 1] , (3)
if and only if no individual changes their taxable income, such that they cross k in response
to the tax reform. It is a rather trivial statement—they are only equivalent if the catego-
rization based on period 1 and period 2 income is the same—but it is crucially important
given that equation (3) is the estimating equation used by the whole of the tax treatment
literature that defines treatment as the observed tax rate change. Observe that equation
(3) could be equally well implemented in panel and repeated-cross sectional data, and the
miscategorization problems are the same for both.
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Before addressing whether this is a reasonable assumption, and the bias induced when
it fails, it is worth discussing a separate potential source of bias that is driven by the use
of different forms of [k, k]. Using [k(1), k(1)] introduces no bias because these cutoffs are
based on pre-treatment income. Alternatively, we may restrict individuals’ membership
period by period, so that the restriction is still [k(1), k(1)] in period 1, but in period 2 it
becomes [k(2), k(2)]. Now, if there is any heterogeneity in the response to the tax rate, t2
will include all individuals who would have been in the sample based on period 1 income plus
all individuals above k(1) who decreased their income enough in response to the tax rate
change to be included based on period 2 income. Therefore, this parameter will be biased
upwards relative to the true average treatment effect. In practice, the latter restriction is not
implemented in analyses using panel data, but it is when conducting analyses using repeated
cross-section data (and it is the only feasible restriction if panel data is not available).
Therefore, when a researcher uses repeated cross-section data, an upper (lower) cutoff will
yield biased estimates if treatment occurs above (below) the tax kink.4
Now, I return to the question of whether the assumption that no individuals cross the
tax kink as part of their behavioral response to the tax reform is valid. My working example
is a tax reform that introduces a tax kink and makes the tax schedule progressive. Either
a tax kink that introduced a regressive tax schedule or a tax notch instead of a tax kink
would clearly violate this assumption. If a regressive tax schedule is introduced, the budget
set becomes convex and individuals are indifferent between points on both sides of the tax
kink. If a tax notch is introduced, there is a discrete decline in the budget set (because there
is a discrete increase in tax liability) above the notch providing very strong incentives for
individuals near the notch to shift their income below the notch (Slemrod, 2010). However,
returning to the working example in this section, the assumption is valid if individuals
respond in a perfectly classical way. Classical economic theory would predict that individuals
4Note that such a cutoff could be included if an instrument was used that was uncorrelated with these
individuals who select into the estimation, but it is unlikely the case in practice, since most instruments used
are functions of pre-response income, which is higher for these individuals by definition.
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do not cross the tax bracket line in light of a marginal tax rate change because, if they had
preferred to be in the other tax bracket, they would have chosen to locate there in the
period prior to the tax reform as well. Note that this classical analysis assumes that some
individuals will stop earning positive amounts in the higher bracket after the reform, but all
of these individuals will choose income Y = k; that is, they will all bunch perfectly at the
tax kink. Therefore, these individuals are not counted as having changed brackets as long
as the upper bracket is defined as Y ≥ k.
However, it is well accepted in the literature that there are optimization frictions which
violate the classical model. For example, a recent paper by Chetty (2009) uses the presence of
optimization frictions to provide an explanation of the variation in the ETI estimates across
different studies. Empirically, several different types of optimization frictions have been an-
alyzed, including imperfect bunching and occupational switching. For perfect bunching to
exist at the tax kink, individuals have to be perfectly attentive to the location of the tax
kink each year and perfectly able to manipulate their taxable income precisely. However,
everything we know anecdotally and empirically highlights that this is not the case in prac-
tice. Rather, bunching is imperfect. For example, Chetty et al. (2011b) find statistically
significant bunching in Denmark. While Saez (2010) does not find statistically significant
bunching at most tax kinks in the U.S. overall, the results in Chetty et al. (2011a) suggest
that this is due to an inability to detect sharp bunching in aggregate, which does not imply
that it does not exist within certain responsive subpopulations. Imperfect labor markets
may well cause individuals to cross tax bracket lines in the event of a tax reform, as they
alter the benefits associated with switching.5 Note that for this and all other examples of
adjustment costs, difference-in-differences is not valid in general, because the true treatment
can never be measured—it is always some combination of present and future marginal tax
rates. However, in cases where individuals do not switch brackets, the estimates are simply
biased downwards because the assigned change in tax treatment between the treatment and
5Powell and Shan (2012) find evidence of occupational switching in the 1980’s in response to the tax rate
changes.
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control groups is too large relative to the truth. When individuals do switch brackets as part
of their response, the bias is more severe, because it appears that those making the largest
tax changes are experiencing a tax rate change of the opposite sign relative to the truth.
With optimization frictions, some individuals who were above k in period 1, will respond
to the tax rate change above k, and this response will alter their taxable income such that
it is below k in period 2. Now equations (2) and (3) are no longer equivalent. Equation
(2) still estimates the same causal average treatment effect because the groups were defined
as a function of period 1 income, which was before any selection took place. However, the
estimate given by equation (3) is biased towards zero because individuals who faced the high
tax rate and responded by moving into the comparison group are now included in Y (c2)
instead of Y (t2).
In the context of panel data, there is not a binary treatment representation for equation
(3), because the treatment definition changes across periods. In reality, the treatment is a
continuous variable—the change in the observed tax rate—but incorporating this measure of
treatment into this analysis makes the analysis less transparent. Without loss of generality
in this section, I define treatment as if it were treatment determined by period 2, D(t2). It
is without loss of generality because, in this simple setup, treatment in period 1 is accurately
measured. Defining treatment in this way, we can rewrite equation (3) as:
ε = E [Y (t2)− Y (c2) | T = 2]− E [Y (t2)− Y (c2) | T = 1]
= E [∆Y (t2)−∆Y (c2)] .
(4)
To see the problem induced by treatment mismeasurement in period 2 and the effects of
potential resolutions, I divide individuals i into four principal strata (Frangakis and Rubin,
2002) based on two potential income indicators Si(2) and Si(1):
6
• HH = {i|Si(2) = Si(1) = 1}: individuals who choose income above k without a tax
6I define these groups assuming that the tax rate changes for those above k, which is the most common
form of tax change; however, the results are equivalent if the groups are instead defined assuming that the
tax rate changes below k.
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rate change and have no incentive to deviate below k when the tax rate changes.
• HL = {i|Si(2) = 0, Si(1) = 1}: individuals who choose income above k without a tax
rate change and face an incentive to deviate below k when the tax rate changes above
k.
• LH = {i|Si(2) = 1, Si(1) = 0}: individuals who choose income below k without a tax
rate change and face an incentive to deviate above k when the tax rate changes above
k.
• LL = {i|Si(2) = Si(1) = 0}: individuals who choose income below k without a tax
rate change and face no incentive to deviate above k when the tax rate changes.
The term “incentive to deviate” refers to all individuals who may wish to deviate when the
tax rate changes, whether or not they are, in fact, responsive enough to choose to deviate.
For example, in the case of imperfect bunchers, all individuals bunching just below the tax
kink are potential deviants, whether or not they choose to have income above k after the
tax reform. Defining the groups based on their incentive to deviate rather than their actual
deviation will enable me to define a parameter that will have substantially more policy
relevance.
Assumption 3: When the tax rate increases above k, there should be no individuals of
type LH and when the tax rate decreases above k, there should be no individuals of type HL.
Assumption 3 requires that all individuals move in the appropriate direction in response
to a tax change; that is, when the tax rate rises, no individuals respond by increasing their
income. Let dd = 1 if an individual chooses to deviate and zero otherwise.
If dd = 0 all individuals, I could rewrite equation (4) as:
ε̃ = [P[HH = 1]E[∆Y (t2)|HH = 1]− P[LL = 1]E[∆Y (c2)|LL = 1]] , (5)
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and ε̃ = ε. However, when dd = 1 for some individuals, equation (4) can be rewritten as:
ε = [P[HH = 1]E[∆Y (t2)|HH = 1] + P[HL = 1, dd = 0]E[∆Y (t2)|HL = 1, dd = 0]
−P[HL = 1, dd = 1]E[∆Y (c2)|HL = 1, dd = 1]− P[LL = 1]E[∆Y (c2)|LL = 1]] .
(6)
The gap between the true average treatment effect and the actual estimand, ε̃ − ε, which
is induced by those who choose to deviate below k, can be quantified as 2P[HL = 1, dd =
1]E[∆Y (c2)|HL = 1, dd = 1]. Recall that these are individuals who look as though they are
comparison group individuals, but were, in fact, treated; therefore, this term is expected to
be non-zero.
There are two ways of addressing the fact that ε does not equal ε̃ : a proxy variable or an
instrument. First, consider choosing a proxy variable. In this simplified example, there is a
perfect proxy available—treatment status based on period 1 income. This proxy recovers the
average treatment effect over the whole population given by equation (2). Observe that if this
proxy was used as an instrument to construct estimates using a Wald estimator instead, the
estimates would be biased upwards because the numerator of the Wald estimator would be
the correctly estimated average treatment effect given by equation (2) and the denominator
is not equal to one. It is instead given by:
E[D(t2)|Z = 1]− E[D(t2)|Z = 0] = 1− 2P[HL = 1, dd = 1] < 1, (7)
where Z = D(t1) is the instrument. This unusual result that the Wald estimator does worse
at revealing the population average treatment effect than the reduced-form estimate is due to
the fact that treatment is mismeasured and the Wald estimator is based on the assumption
that D(t2) is wrong and Z is right, not the other way around.
Now, consider an intermediate case in which a proxy is available, but it is imperfect.
Assumption 4a: Suppose Z is an imperfect proxy that identifies an average treatment
effect for a subpopulation of interest.
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Then, the following proposition highlights when this imperfect proxy will suffer from the
same bias as the perfect proxy D(t1), albeit to a lesser extent.
Proposition 1: Given Assumptions 1, 2a, 3, and 4a, the reduced-form estimate will
underestimate the average treatment effect for a given subpopulation. When
P[D(t2) 6= D(t1)|Z = 1]− P[D(t2) 6= D(t1)|Z = 0] > 0, (8)
the Wald estimator will overestimate the average treatment effect for the same subpopula-
tion.
Proof: See Appendix.
Therefore, when Assumptions 1, 2a, 3, and 4a hold along with equation (8), the reduced-form
estimates an intent-to-treat (ITT) effect where Z is an ITT indicator. The Wald estimator
will not reveal the average treatment effect as we would like. Instead, it provides an upper
bound on this parameter and the ITT estimate provides a lower bound. In words, equation
(8) says that the Wald estimator will be biased upwards whenever more selection into the
comparison group in period 2 occurs when the ITT measure Z is turned on. When equation
(8) is instead less than zero, the Wald estimator also underestimates the average treatment
effect.
The Wald estimator is not biased when equation (8) is equal to zero. One assumption
that will guarantee this condition holds is given by:
Assumption 4b: Let Z be a trivial function of the treatment indicator D(·) for each
stratum except HH and LL.
Put another way, Assumption 4b assumes that D(t2) and Z are independent among groups
of individuals with an incentive to deviate. The assumptions and proposition that follows
examines the average treatment effect that is obtained when Assumption 4b holds.
Assumption 2b: Let the difference in potential outcomes ∆Y (HH) − ∆Y (LL) be the
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same for all individuals in strata HH or LL.
Assumption 2b revises Assumption 2a for this context and requires that all individuals
with no incentive to deviate will respond in the same way to these treatments, on average.
In the context of a tax reform, this condition requires that individuals below the tax kink
would respond the same to the treatment if they were above and vice versa. This assumption
is actually stronger than necessary. ∆Y (HH) − ∆Y (LL) can vary across individuals with
no incentive to deviate, but this variation must be independent of Z. A popular alternative
to Assumption 2b is monotonicity.7 This restriction would generate a LATE-style FBATE
parameter, but I do not focus on this restriction, because instruments used in this literature
are either not monotonic or grossly violate Assumption 4b.
Assumption 5: Let the potential outcome ∆Y (·) and the treatment indicator D(·) be
jointly independent of Z for each principal stratum.
Assumption 5 includes the standard instrument exogeneity condition, which has been a
focal point of instrument selection in the tax reform treatment literature.8 This also imposes
the common assumption that the growth rate of Y in the absence of the tax reform must
be the same above and below the kink.9 However, neither of these restrictions are relevant
until the next subsection when Assumption 1 is relaxed.
Proposition 2: Given Assumptions 1, 2b, 3, 4b, and 5, the Fixed-Bracket Average
Treatment Effect (FBATE) is obtained from the Wald estimator and is given by:
εFBATE = E[∆Y (HH)−∆Y (LL)|HH + LL = 1]. (9)
Proof: See Appendix.
I term this parameter the Fixed-Bracket Average Treatment Effect (FBATE), because it is
7Monotonicity is the assumption used by Angrist and Imbens (1994) to obtain the Local Average Treat-
ment Effect (LATE).
8In reality, despite the literature’s general concern with this condition, many instruments used violate
this condition. For example, see Weber (2011).
9Alternatively, additional variables could be used to control for the heterogeneous growth rate.
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the average treatment effect for individuals with no incentive to cross tax bracket lines in
response to a tax reform (e.g. those in strata HH and LL).
The implications of Propositions 1 and 2 also apply to repeated cross-section analysis,
because the treatment mismeasurement problem in period 2 that is analyzed here applies
equally well to the repeated-cross-section context. The instrument must be independent of
the same subpopulations in period 2 regardless of whether the data is panel or repeated-cross-
section and a good repeated-cross-section instrument will capture the same subpopulations
in both periods. Often, the most substantive concern with repeated cross-section analysis
is a change in the composition of the treatment and comparison groups between period 1
and period 2. Proposition 2 highlights that if the instrument is chosen properly to address
treatment mismeasurement, the composition bias is also eliminated; that is, in the repeated
cross-section context, treatment mismeasurement and composition bias manifest themselves
amongst the same subpopulation and addressing the former also addresses the latter.
2.2 Causal Inference with Secular Changes in Tax Rates
This subsection revisits the propositions derived in the last subsection when Assumption 1,
which was used to provide a stylized example but does not hold in practice, is relaxed. The
key results still hold, but they are more nuanced and require new assumptions to address
the additional complexities introduced once Assumption 1 is relaxed.
Without Assumption 1 in place, individuals face transitory income shocks and secular
trends in income that will move them across tax bracket lines between periods, regardless
of whether there is a tax rate change. These both may induce tax rate changes, but these
changes are not expected to be exogenous. Often, these shocks are correlated with the out-
come of interest and, in general, individuals always have an incentive to deviate in response
to these tax changes. Responsive individuals who face a transitory increase (decrease) in
their marginal tax rate this period will shift income out of (into) this period and into (out
of) the following period.
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For example, suppose there is a marginal tax rate change at $70,000, the individual’s
permanent income level is $65,000, and this individual receives a positive shock of $6,000
this period, so that this individual’s total income is $71,000. Shifting $1,000-$5,000 of income
into the next period minimizes tax liability. Only if the individual happens to choose $1,000
will this response not induce a deviation across tax bracket lines. Note that if the individual’s
permanent income was instead $68,000, the individual would no longer be able to avoid the
higher marginal tax rate on all their income and the tax minimizing range of shifting across
periods would be $2,000-$3,000. This analysis assumes the tax bracket is fixed at $70,000
in both periods and there is no anticipated change in the legislated tax rates in period 2 (so
individuals make decisions in period 1 as if there are no legislated tax rate changes in period
2). In this framework, individuals will have an incentive to deviate unless the transitory
income shocks they receive do not cause them to move to a different tax bracket if they do
not deviate. Because individuals who face changes in their tax rate due to transitory income
shocks and secular income trends face an incentive to deviate, they will now be included
in the strata HL and LH. If there is an anticipated tax reform, this may alter shifting
incentives. This case is discussed in detail in Subsection 2.3.
Period 1 income is no longer a perfect proxy for treatment status, because some individ-
uals face a new marginal tax rate in period 2 due to secular trends and transitory shocks.
Therefore, researchers no longer observe true treatment status. Period 1 income is also not
exogenous if transitory income shocks are serially correlated and the outcome variable of
interest is a function of the variable that determines an individuals’ location on the tax
schedule (Weber, 2011), so even if this measure is being used as an imperfect proxy for
treatment, an instrument is still needed to address its endogeneity. This is clearly true in
the context of the elasticity of taxable income, where the change in taxable income is the
outcome and the location on the tax schedule is also determined by taxable income.
To examine the causal average treatment effect that can be obtained when period 1
income is used to define treatment, consider the following variation of the four principal
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strata considered in the previous subsection, which are now divided based on two potential
income indicators Si(2)
′ and Si(1)
′. This version categorizes individuals exclusively based
on incentives to deviate generated by transitory income shocks and secular trends:
• HH ′ = {i|Si(2)′ = Si(1)′ = 1}: individuals whose income is above k in period 1 and
in period 2′.
• HL′ = {i|Si(2)′ = 0, Si(1)′ = 1}: individuals whose income is above k in period 1 and
below k in period 2′.
• LH ′ = {i|Si(2)′ = 1, Si(1)′ = 0}: individuals whose income is below k in period 1 and
above k in period 2′.
• LL′ = {i|Si(2)′ = Si(1)′ = 0}: individuals whose income is below k in period 1 and in
period 2′.
Period 2′ indicates income in period 2 excluding any behavioral response to tax rate changes,
where the tax changes were either legislated or induced by a transitory income shock or
secular trend.
Assumption 4c: Let Z be a trivial function of D for each strata except HH ′ and LL′.
Put another way, Assumption 4c assumes that D and Z are independent among groups
of individuals who face transitory income shocks or secular income trends that would induce
a tax rate change and thus provide them with an incentive to deviate.
Assumption 2c: Let the difference in potential outcomes ∆Y (HH ′)−∆Y (LL′) be the
same, on average, for all individuals in strata HH ′ or LL′.
Assumption 2c revises Assumption 2b for this context. The discussion of Assumption 2b
also applies here.
Proposition 3: Given Assumptions 2c, 4c, and 5, the following treatment effect is
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obtained from a Wald estimator when treatment status is defined by period 1 income:
εp1 = E[∆Y (HH ′)−∆Y (LL′)|HH ′ + LL′ = 1]. (10)
Proof: See Appendix.
Note that εp1 may include all individuals with an incentive to deviate due to the legislated
tax rate change in period 2 just as the average treatment effect based on period 1 income
(equation 1) did in the last subsection. The difference is that, in this subsection, εp1 is iden-
tified for a subpopulation which does not include individuals with an incentive to deviate
based on tax changes induced by transitory income shocks or secular income trends. There-
fore, defining treatment in this way still has the possibility of identifying the parameter of
interest for a larger subpopulation under weaker assumptions, than defining treatment as
treatment status based on period by period income, which is considered next.
Treatment status could also be defined by observed income in each period. However, as
in the last subsection, I will consider a simpler version of this (treatment based on period 2
income), which is without loss of generality for the results I wish to highlight in this section.
To define the causal average treatment effect that can be obtained in this case, consider the
following principal strata which combine the previous two sets of strata used to incorporate
incentives to deviate from both legislated tax rate changes and tax rate changes due to
secular income trends and transitory income shocks:
• HH ′′ = {i|HHi = HH ′i = 1}: individuals whose income is above k in period 2′ and
who face no incentive to deviate below k in period 2.
• HL′′ = {i|HLi = 1 or HL′i = 1}: individuals whose income is above k in period 2′ and
who face an incentive to deviate below k in period 2.
• LH ′′ = {i|LHi = 1 or LH ′i = 1}: individuals whose income is below k in period 2′ and
who face an incentive to deviate above k in period 2.
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• LL′′ = {i|LL′i = LLi = 1}: individuals whose income is below k in period 2′ and who
face no incentive to deviate above k in period 2.
Assumption 4d: Let Z be a trivial function of D for each stratum except HH ′′ and
LL′′.
Put another way, Assumption 4d assumes that D and Z are independent among groups of
individuals who face an incentive to deviate when their tax rate changes for any reason,
legislated or otherwise.
Assumption 2d: Let the difference in potential outcomes ∆Y (HH ′′)−∆Y (LL′′) be the
same, on average, for all individuals in strata HH ′′ or LL′′.
Assumption 2d revises Assumption 2b for this context, and the same discussion in that
context also applies here.
Proposition 4: Given Assumptions 2d, 4d and 5, a Fixed-Bracket Average Treatment
Effect (FBATE) is obtained from the Wald estimator and is given by:
ε′FBATE = E[∆Y (HH ′′)−∆Y (LL′′)|HH ′′ + LL′′ = 1]. (11)
Proof: See Appendix.
The interpretation is similar to the Fixed-Bracket Average Treatment Effect obtained in the
previous subsection. It is the average treatment effect for individuals with no incentive to
cross a tax bracket line in response to a tax reform or tax change brought about by a shock
in taxable income or secular income trend.10
Corollary 1: When the assumptions for Propositions 3 and 4 hold simultaneously for a
particular instrument Z, εp1 = ε
′
FBATE.
10Note that this paper exclusively discusses average treatment effects for notational convenience. However,
the results could all easily be applied to elasticities, which are commonly estimated in the literature by
replacing the treatment indicators with the log net-of-tax rate faced.
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Note that the assumptions required in order to obtain ε′FBATE are stronger than those re-
quired to obtain εp1, in the sense that the instrument Z must be independent of all incentives
to deviate, not just those associated with secular income trends and transitory income shocks.
Given Corollary 1, one way to test whether the additional assumptions necessary to obtain
ε′FBATE hold is to use the same instrument with treatment defined as for εp1. If the two es-
timates are not statistically different and the shared assumptions are valid, we cannot reject
the null hypothesis that the additional assumptions do, in fact, hold.
The discussion up to this point has assumed that there was no tax kink in period 1
and a progressive income tax in period 2. While this is sometimes accurate, there are also
many tax reforms where the tax kink existed before the reform, and there are also occasional
examples where part of the tax schedule is regressive. Introducing all these variations has
no effect on Proposition 4, although it may change the number of potential deviants in
strata HL and LH. Introducing these variations matters for Proposition 3 to the extent
that these deviations introduce potential deviants that belong in the strata LH, because for
these individuals, they will appear in the comparison group in period 1, but are responding
to the tax rate change in the treatment group.11 This introduces additional treatment
mismeasurement into treatment status defined as a function of period 1 income. Leaving
the strata defined as before will introduce a downward bias in the estimates if most of the
mismeasurement occurs when Z = 0 and an upward bias otherwise. Alternatively, the strata
can be revised to incorporate these incentives to deviate. This yields an average treatment
effect for a subpopulation that is narrower than that originally found in Proposition 3 but
still wider than that found by its analogue in Proposition 4.
I will not repeat the discussion in the last subsection, but it is worthwhile noting that, just
as in Subsection 2.1, the implications in this subsection also apply to repeated-cross-section
analysis. The discussion regarding the choice of the sample thresholds [k, k] in Subsection
11Before the introduction of these variations, there were individuals with incentives to deviate of type
HL, but the relevant group for these individuals was the treated group, so period 1 treatment assignment
was correct.
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2.1 also applies here. However, now there is an additional concern. Suppose the cutoff is
a function of period 1 income. Then, around k, some individuals who would be excluded
except that they receive a negative transitory income shock in period 1 are included and
some individuals who would be included except that they receive a positive transitory income
shock are excluded. The reverse is true around k. A similar story applies for secular income
trends. For these cutoffs to not bias the estimates in the panel context, the instruments must
be independent of the selection induced in the outcome of interest by using these cutoffs.
When using period-by-period cutoffs with repeated-cross-section data, the same requirement
applies, or the cutoff must induce the same bias in both periods (which is then netted out
when the two periods are differenced).
2.3 Anticipated Tax Reforms
Anticipated tax reforms have been ignored up to this point and are the focus of this subsec-
tion. I discuss the challenges faced when examining anticipated tax reforms assuming that
the researcher has decided to estimate a separate parameter which captures the response to
the anticipated tax change. The discussion in this subsection applies equally well to a tax
reform that is anticipated and an anticipated change in the tax schedule due to something
like the loss of a dependent. Except in the most ideal (and likely unrealistic) situations,
the anticipation of the tax reform creates additional incentives to deviate; often these incen-
tives to deviate apply to a large portion of the population being analyzed and likely make
it impossible to estimate a causal FBATE parameter of the response to the anticipated tax
change. This is, unfortunately, the approach used to analyze the response to anticipated tax
changes throughout the ETI literature, charitable giving literature, and elsewhere.12
As an example, consider the tax reform discussed in Subsection 2.1 and depicted in Figure
5. Suppose in period 1 individuals with taxable income above k learn that their marginal tax
rate will decrease in period 2 due to a change in the tax schedule. Let the treatment effect
12For example, see Bakija and Heim (2011).
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of interest be the change in the outcome between period 0 and period 1 in response to the
anticipated tax change that takes place between period 1 and period 2. I consider a simple
binary version of treatment, where the treatment variable DA equals one when the measured
anticipated treatment is not zero, and zero otherwise. As in the last subsections, considering
this binary version of treatment makes the intuition clearer and the notation cleaner without
loss of generality for the points I wish to make. The researcher will simultaneously control
for any contemporaneous tax reforms using the methodology discussed in the previous sub-
sections. Assume throughout this subsection that the estimation of that parameter is done
correctly, although observe that additional incentives to deviate discussed in this section
also introduce additional treatment mismeasurement into the contemporaneous treatment
variable. If we conclude that it is not possible to obtain a causal estimate of the anticipated
tax change, we will not be able to obtain a causal estimate of the contemporaneous change
either.
The true anticipated treatment measured period by period is non-zero either because
there is an anticipated change in the legislated tax rate between period 1 and period 2 or
because an individual receives a transitory income shock in period 1 or period 2 that makes
the tax rate different across the two periods. The former identifies the parameter of interest
in this subsection. The latter has already been discussed in the context of Subsection 2.2.
Recall from that discussion that all tax changes caused by transitory income shocks provide
an incentive to deviate, so the instrument needs to be independent of these changes. The
same requirement is needed in this subsection when estimating the effect of the anticipated
treatment. Additionally, all individuals with an incentive to deviate either in response to
the anticipated or the contemporaneous tax rate change create a treatment mismeasurement
problem as before.
The relevant strata are now HH ′′, HL′′, LH ′′ and LL′′, where the membership in strata
LH and HL now is also determined by incentives to deviate in response to anticipated
legislated tax rate changes. Therefore, if the same conditions are satisfied for these strata,
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Proposition 4 applies as before. The rest of this subsection focuses on who is now included
in strata HL and LH. Given this, the feasibility of obtaining an FBATE estimate of the
anticipated tax change is discussed.
Let R be the amount of taxable income the individual reports in each period and SH be
the amount of income that can be shifted across two periods. When SH = 0, there will be
no treatment mismeasurement because no shifting is possible. However, it makes no sense
to estimate the response to DA if SH = 0 because the response will be zero by construction.
Therefore, I assume SH > 0 throughout this subsection.
Consider individuals that are in the treatment group in both periods absent a tax reform.
If these individuals decide to respond in period 1 to the legislated tax change in period 2
depicted in Figure 5, they will attempt to shift as much of their income out of period 2 as
possible up to R = k and shift it into period 1. If they can shift smoothly (that is no one
shifts to R < k), then there is no incentive to deviate. However, if perfect smoothing is not
possible, this creates an incentive to deviate. We don’t have clear evidence on the degree to
which perfect smoothing across periods is possible, but if evidence from the static context,
such as imperfect bunching, is any guide, imperfect smoothing exists. Unfortunately, that
means that anytime DA = 1, there is an incentive to deviate (at least within a reasonable
region around the tax kink), and thus the parameter must be independent of all responses.
Therefore, it is not possible to obtain a causal average treatment effect using a period by
period measure of treatment.
Even if we assume perfect smoothing, more complicated tax reforms are problematic.13
As an example, consider a case where there are only two tax brackets and the tax rate re-
mains fixed across periods, but the location of the tax kink moves from $60,000 in period 1
to $70,000 in period 2. Let permanent income, absent a tax reform, be $62,000. Individuals
can minimize their tax liability across periods by shifting income into period 2 anywhere in
13This is somewhat in contrast to estimation of FBATE in the absence of anticipation, where a more
complicated reform may introduce more chances to deviate, but does not eliminate the possibility of obtaining
FBATE altogether.
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the range $2,000-$8,000. Unless the individual chooses to shift exactly $2,000 this creates
treatment mismeasurement; therefore, these individuals have an incentive to deviate. More
generally, all individuals with permanent income levels between the old and new tax kink
location who can shift their income to avoid the higher tax rate in either period face an in-
centive to deviate. Therefore, the instrument would need to be independent of all individuals
in this region.
As the tax schedule becomes even more complex (i.e. there is more than one kink), the
requirements needed to obtain FBATE become even more rigorous. Suppose, for example,
that the reform collapses multiple brackets at the top of the income distribution into a
single bracket as in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86). Let the marginal tax rate in
this bracket in period 2 be lower than any of the marginal tax rates in period 1 that were
collapsed in this tax bracket. Then, individuals’ incentives to shift income into period 1
no longer end at the tax kink of their current brackets, but rather continues all the way
down to the new highest tax kink. As a result, all individuals that face an incentive to
cross tax bracket lines for this reason face an incentive to deviate. Thus, a valid instrument
would have to be independent of all individuals in this region, which effectively rules out
estimating a causal anticipation effect for everyone except individuals in the very top tax
bracket. Even if an instrument satisfies this constraint, it is likely that Assumption 2d will
fail due to the resulting dissimilarities of the two groups who are left that can be compared
(i.e the treatment and comparison groups now come from quite different points in the income
distribution, and this may lead to a variety of differences between the two groups besides
the tax rate change).
With shifting income across periods, defining the anticipated treatment as a function of
period 1 income (instead of period by period income) does not resolve the problem because
treatment in period 1 is also often mismeasured (because individuals are shifting into or out
of period 1). Instead, Proposition 3 would have to be applied to period 0 income. If period 0
income were used to define the anticipated tax rate change, it would also need to be used to
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define treatment for the contemporaneous tax rate change because period 1 income is now
also mismeasured for the contemporaneous tax change. Depending on the application, this
may increase the variance of the estimates too much to be feasible.
3 Empirical Applications
This section applies the results to the existing empirical literature that attempts to estimate
the behavioral response to a tax reform. This illustrates how the assumptions discussed in
the previous section are applied empirically. It also highlights the likelihood that causal
parameters, which can be interpreted as FBATEs, are being obtained in several sizable
literatures that attempt to identify the behavioral response to a tax rate change using the
Wald estimator.
Empirically, there is some evidence that an FBATE parameter can be obtained in the
context of the ETI. For example, Weber (2011) shows that a large number of existing ETI
instruments are endogenous as long as transitory income follows an autocorrelated process.
She proposes the following related instrument: the predicted tax rate change as a function
of income lagged two periods prior to the base year of the difference.14 Suppose there is
no anticipation of the tax reform. Weber (2011) provides evidence that the instrument
exogeneity condition holds when the appropriate controls are used.
Verifying Assumption 4d is more difficult. For example, the instrument proposed by We-
ber (2011) would violate Assumption 4d if the behavior of individuals who bunch around the
kink is relatively stationary over time; that is, individuals who were imperfectly bunched be-
low the kink two periods ago are still there today. A similar concern could be raised regarding
other optimization frictions. However, Weber (2011) shows that the differences between the
estimates obtained using period 1 treatment status and actual treatment status are minimal,
suggesting that the instrument is, in fact, doing a relatively good job of obtaining FBATE.
Moreover, she finds that using treatment status based on period 1 income is associated with
14This instrument will be relevant as long as income two periods ago is indicative of income today.
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a substantial reduction in standard errors because there is less treatment mismeasurement.
This suggests that when Corollary 1 holds, using this alternative definition of treatment is
preferable. Additionally, if the conditions for Proposition 3 are not met because of optimiza-
tion frictions, it is likely that defining treatment as a function of period 1 income obtains a
lower bound because the tax reform examined was primarily a tax decrease, so most of the
individuals who suffered from treatment mismeasurement appear in the comparison group.
To the extent that Proposition 3 fails, it is likely that most are in the instrument comparison
group as well. The weaker form of Assumption 2d—that ∆Y (HH ′′) −∆Y (LL′′) may vary
across individuals within strata HH ′′ and LL′′, but is independent of the instrument—is
likely to hold in this context, because it is unlikely that income two periods ago predicts an
individuals’ responsiveness today.
Now consider another prominent empirical literature that estimates the behavioral re-
sponse to a tax rate change—charitable giving. I consider a recent approach to examining
this response, which estimates dynamic responses to contemporaneous and anticipated future
changes in the marginal tax rate (Bakija and Heim, 2011). The estimates in this literature
are restricted to the intensive margin; that is, individuals who itemize only because of posi-
tive charitable giving are excluded because of endogeneity concerns. This literature usually
constructs the estimating equation in levels and employs year and individual fixed-effects.
The results in this paper apply equally well to both this context and difference-in-differences,
but to keep the discussion consistent, I will consider a simple hypothetical example in which
there are only two years of data.15 Crucially, the empirical specification controls for tran-
sitory taxable income shocks. The parameters that capture the effect of transitory taxable
income shocks can never be properly identified because transitory income shocks are a func-
tion of the response; that is, anytime charitable giving changes in response to a transitory
income shock, the magnitude of the observed shock changes. But let’s set that issue aside.
First, consider the estimation of the response to contemporaneous changes in the marginal
15Then difference-in-differences and fixed-effect estimation are equivalent.
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tax rate. The instrument used in this context is the change in the tax rate on the first dollar
of charitable giving. The instrument exogeneity condition will hold if a secular decision to
donate more to charity is independent of the tax rate faced for the first dollar of charitable
giving. This is reasonable as long as other components of taxable income do not respond
to this decision (which is an odd assumption to make because part of the premise of this
estimation is that one expects that charitable giving will respond to shocks in other pieces
of taxable income).
Assumption 4d will likely fail. Particularly concerning in this context are individuals
who are categorized in strata HL′ and LH ′ because of transitory income shocks. Charitable
giving is likely a highly shiftable form of income. To the extent that these individuals
use charitable giving and other forms of shiftable income to minimize their tax liability,
substantial treatment mismeasurement is introduced. The instrument used is either perfectly
correlated with these deviations or is a predictor of the individuals’ responsiveness (and thus
violates Assumption 2d). In particular, the instrument will exactly mirror the movement in
the mismeasured treatment unless, without charitable giving, the marginal tax rate would
change; that is to say, it is changes in charitable giving that push the individual over the
tax bracket line. However, these individuals are highly responsive by definition, making the
instrument a good predictor of the potential outcome ∆Y (HH ′′)−∆Y (LL′′).
Now consider estimating the response to anticipated future tax changes for charitable
giving. The instrument for the future tax change used by Bakija and Heim (2011) is tomor-
row’s tax rate as a function of today’s income (i.e. it relies on future pre-announced changes
and is not a function of tomorrow’s change in taxable income). The tax reforms used to
identify this parameter are complex; one of the reforms used is TRA86, which was discussed
in Subsection 2.3. This means there are many incentives to deviate for a large portion of




This section discusses a wide range of broader implications of this paper. A wide range
of topics are covered, including the degree to which FBATE is a relevant parameter for
deadweight loss. I also use the results in Section 2 to highlight that other forms of identifying
variation, such as a change in dependent or bracket creep, cannot identify a causal average
treatment effect.
Given that the estimates in the literatures that attempt to estimate the causal effect of
a tax rate change are often used to calculate deadweight loss, it is important to consider
to what extent FBATE—the parameter obtained by Proposition 4—is actually the relevant
parameter for policy analysis. Considering the example of the ETI, which applies more gen-
erally to many settings, Chetty (2011) shows that the bounds on the structural parameter
relevant for welfare analysis are tighter when optimization frictions are low and marginal
tax rate changes are high. When the potential outcomes split by the principal strata are
homogeneous across all individuals, this parameter will be the relevant structural parameter
for welfare analysis as long as the tax reform was large enough to induce individuals to over-
come their optimization frictions (Chetty, 2011). However, when they are not homogeneous
across all individuals, there are several things to note.
First, if those with an incentive to deviate face higher optimization frictions relative to the
average, FBATE will provide tighter bounds on the welfare parameter than a simple average
treatment effect. Put another way, if those with an incentive to deviate will eventually
respond in the same way as those that do not, FBATE will provide tighter bounds on the
welfare parameter than a simple average treatment effect. Second, larger legislated changes
in marginal tax rates are more informative regarding the structural welfare parameter, but
these same reforms induce more bracket crossing, and are thus less likely to satisfy FBATE.
If Assumption 4 fails in a given context, there is a trade-off to consider when selecting the
optimal size of the tax rate change. A larger marginal tax rate change will get closer to the
structural parameter desired for welfare calculations among individuals that do not violate
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Assumption 4, but the bias induced by the increase in individuals that violate Assumption
4 is larger.
Third, note that if the heterogeneity in the potential outcomes is not due to optimization
frictions, but rather due to variations in underlying preferences, the elasticity estimates
obtained are no longer guaranteed to be relevant for welfare analysis. This is because FBATE
is independent of the response of those with an incentive to deviate who are now allowed
to respond differently to a change in their marginal tax rate relative to those who are not
potential deviants. For example, this would occur if individuals who bunch imperfectly would
respond differently, on average, than individuals located further away from the tax kink if
the imperfect bunchers found themselves further away from a tax kink.
Proposition 1 highlights new trade-offs between estimating reduced-form ITT estimates
and a Wald estimate of the average treatment effect. While the assumptions used to gen-
erate Proposition 1 do not hold exactly in practice, the general point still applies. Usually,
the purpose of constructing the Wald estimate is to rescale the ITT estimate to recover
the average treatment effect. However, Proposition 1 suggests that in this context, if the
ITT measure is not independent of the mismeasurement, the Wald estimate will likely not
reveal the average treatment effect, and could substantially overstate the truth as the proxy
becomes a better and better measure of actual treatment. That said, there are contexts
in which it can be interpreted as an upper bound (and the ITT estimate provides a lower
bound). Moreover, estimating ITT parameters avoids the relatively strong assumptions re-
quired to obtain FBATE. Ultimately, which method is preferred should be informed both by
which parameter is expected to be more relevant for deadweight loss and whether picking
an instrument that will allow FBATE to be obtained is feasible in a given setting.
Given that the instruments used are often likely correlated with individuals who bunch
around the kink, a few more things about this issue should be noted. The degree of imperfect
bunching is something that can be tested for using the methodology proposed in Saez (2010)
and revised in Weber (2012). In the tax literature, it has become popular to estimate the
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degree of bunching as a possible alternative way to estimate the ETI (for example, Saez
2010, Chetty et al. 2011b, or Weber 2012). Once substantial imperfect bunching has been
documented, it is not appropriate to proceed with difference-in-differences estimation, unless
an instrument is found that is independent of these individuals.16
When FBATE fails, the distance between FBATE and the estimate obtained is a function
of the portion of the income distribution examined. The advantage of examining a narrow
range of the income distribution is that assumptions regarding the similarity of potential
outcomes between the treatment and comparison groups are more likely to hold. However,
these are also the individuals who are most likely to face an incentive to deviate, because
they are near the tax kink, and thus more often face incentives to cross it. As a result,
including individuals further away from a given tax kink provides a trade-off when FBATE
is not obtained between diluting the effect of violations of Assumption 4d and violating
Assumption 5.
This paper has focused on tax reforms as identifying the causal effect of a tax rate
change. Other sources of changes in the tax schedule, such as bracket creep17 or a change
in the number of dependents18 have been touted in the literature as having the following
advantage: “...one can compare taxpayers who are very similar both in income and initial
marginal tax rate but yet face different prospects for changes in marginal tax rates and hence
potentially make a much more convincing case for identification. The main drawback of this
strategy is that taxpayers may not be aware of the minute details of the tax code...(Saez
16Although, note that it is possible that there is a reasonable degree of bunching, but relative to the whole
population being treated by the tax reform, the group of individuals who would find it potentially optimal
to bunch at kink points is small. In this case, these individuals will still bias the estimates, but their effect
may be negligible relative to the overall estimate. Note that, even in this case, the individuals contributing
to the bunching estimates are not the same individuals (hopefully) as those contributing to the estimates in
the context of difference-in-differences. Therefore, although the estimates are likely similar, there is nothing
to preclude the estimates from these two methods from being entirely different.
17In the U.S., the personal income marginal tax rate schedule was fixed in nominal terms until 1985. Saez
(2003) uses this source of variation to estimate the ETI during 1979-1981, which was a period of about 10
percent inflation.
18This source of variation is used by Looney and Singhal (2006). They argue that the individuals they
examine are likely not to respond to the future tax change before it is implemented. However, this identifi-
cation remains similarly problematic to bracket creep unless individuals respond, but never by shifting their
income below the tax bracket line, which obviously cannot be true.
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et al., 2012).” From the perspective of this paper, such an identification strategy is even
more fundamentally problematic. For example, consider using bracket creep as identifying
variation. Now, the treatment is not zero only when an individual moves across the tax
bracket line. As a result, individuals who wish to shift their income across time periods to
minimize their overall tax burden or those who do not wish to earn income in the next bracket
due to their labor-leisure preferences are less likely to be observed as treated. This will create
a substantial downward bias in the estimates unless the instrument is independent of these
incentives to deviate. But, unfortunately almost everyone faces an incentive to deviate given
the narrow window examined on either side of the tax kink, so no causal parameter can be
identified.
5 Conclusion
This paper has examined the conditions necessary to obtain a causal average treatment effect
for the behavioral response to a tax change when it is identified by exploiting variation in the
degree to which a tax reform affects different groups of individuals based on their individual
characteristics and tax situations. The analysis has highlighted that more conditions are
necessary to obtain a causal average treatment effect than were previously acknowledged by
the literature. Satisfying these assumptions can often be relatively restrictive, leading to the
identification of a parameter over a certain subpopulations. Even if a causal parameter is
identified, researchers must carefully consider whether the parameter obtained is relevant for
welfare or other policy analysis.
Choosing an alternative definition of treatment that is a function of base-year income
allows the parameter to possibly be estimated over a larger subpopulation under weaker
assumptions. In a similar vein, if a researcher has a reasonable measure of intent-to-treat
in a given context, the researcher can often be better off using this intent-to-treat measure
directly rather than rescaling by the fraction who were treated according to a measure of
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observed treatment, even if the latter parameter is the policy relevant one. This result is
unusual and exists in this context because treatment cannot be accurately measured for all
subpopulations.
These results provide a new set of trade-offs regarding what is ideal. In addition to
highlighting the trade-offs between a small and large tax reform, the benefits and drawbacks
of different forms of identification, and so forth, they also bring up a more fundamental
question. Are there contexts when using an instrumental variables strategy is not ideal
for policy analysis? The answer is certainly yes, and this paper highlights many of the
important points researchers should consider when asking whether this is the best approach
for identifying their parameter of interest.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
By definition, if Z is an imperfect proxy for D(t1), the reduced-form estimate will under-
estimate the average treatment effect because it will miscategorize some individuals relative
to their actual treatment status.
The Wald estimator will overestimate the average treatment effect whenever the denom-
inator of the Wald estimator (which is always a fraction) is smaller than it should be based
on actual treatment D(t1). Mathematically, this condition is given by:
(E[D(t2)|Z = 1]− E[D(t2)|Z = 0])− (E[D(t1)|Z = 1]− E[D(t1)|Z = 0]) < 0.
This can be rewritten as:
(P[D(t2) = D(t1)|Z = 1] · E[D(t2)|Z = 1, D(t2) = D(t1)]]
+ P[D(t2) 6= D(t1)|Z = 1] · E[D(t2)|Z = 1, D(t2) 6= D(t1)]
− P[D(t2) = D(t1)|Z = 0] · E[D(t2)|Z = 0, D(t2) = D(t1)]
−P[D(t2) 6= D(t1)|Z = 0] · E[D(t2)|Z = 0, D(t2) 6= D(t1)])
− (E[D(t1)|Z = 1]− E[D(t1)|Z = 0]) < 0.
By Assumption 3, this can be rewritten as:
P[D(t2) 6= D(t1)|Z = 1]− P[D(t2) 6= D(t1)|Z = 0] > 0.
QED.
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Proof of Proposition 2:
I begin by comparing E[∆Y |Z = z] at z = 0 and z = 1 in period 2. I prove it for the
case of a tax increase, but an equivalent proof would apply for a tax decrease. I cheat on
notation at the beginning of the proof using D(HL, ·) to indicate membership in strata HL
rather than the actual treatment in each period.19 By Assumption 3:
E[∆Y |Z = 1]− E[∆Y |Z = 0]
= E[D(HH, 1) ·∆Y (HH) +D(HL, 1) ·∆Y (HL) + (1−D(HH, 1)−D(HL, 1)) ·∆Y (LL)|Z = 1]
− E[D(HH, 0) ·∆Y (HH) +D(HL, 0) ·∆Y (HL) + (1−D(HH, 0)−D(HL, 0)) ·∆Y (LL)|Z = 0]
By Assumptions 4b and 5:
= E[(D(HH, 1)−D(HH, 0)) · (∆Y (HH)−∆Y (LL))]
+ E[(D(HL, 1)−D(HL, 0)) · (∆Y (HL)−∆Y (LL))].
By Assumption 4b:
= E[(D(HH, 1)−D(HH, 0)) · (∆Y (HH)−∆Y (LL))]
= P[D(HH, 1)−D(HH, 0) = 1] · E[(∆Y (HH)−∆Y (LL))|D(HH, 1)−D(HH, 0) = 1]
− P[D(HH, 1)−D(HH, 0) = −1] · E[(∆Y (HH)−∆Y (LL))|D(HH, 1)−D(HH, 0) = −1].
By Assumptions 2b and 4b:
= P[D(HH, 1)−D(HH, 0)] · E[∆Y (HH)−∆Y (LL)|HH + LL = 1].
Then, it is obvious that the Wald estimator gives:
= E[∆Y (HH)−∆Y (LL)|HH + LL = 1].
19I do this because it saves notation overall, and by assumption, those in strata HL will drop out during
the course of the proof.
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Proofs of Propositions 3 and 4:
These proofs are identical to that from Proposition 2, replacing the strata from Proposition
2 with the appropriate strata for Propositions 3 and 4. Therefore, I do not repeat the proofs
for these propositions here.
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